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I. INTRODUCTION
Many of our nation's people would argue that progress must be made in
the construction of a permanent nuclear waste repository.' We must ask our-
selves, however, at what cost the present delays should end. Should we rely on
contractual deadlines and politics rather than science? Should we forsake ade-
quate environmental, geological, and engineering studies in our efforts to speed
up the process? Should we hurry the process at the risk of construction
defects? If there is not enough money to safely construct the facility, should
the government merely do the best it can with what it has and move on with the
process? While it may seem unlikely that anyone would answer these ques-
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I While the State of Nevada, several environmental groups, and many scientists oppose the
hastening of construction at Yucca Mountain, the only potential repository site currently
being considered, many others, including Congress, the DOE, the nuclear power industry,
and several other states where nuclear power is generated, are pushing for immediate con-
struction of a repository. 42 U.S.C. § 10172(a) (1997). Compare Scott Allen, If We Can't
Bury Nuclear Waste in Nevada, Where Can We?, BOSTON GLOBE, May 17, 1993, at 25,
available at 1993 WL 6593407 (Nevadans oppose the Yucca Mountain repository 3-to-I and
the state refused a $100 million per year offer from the federal government to give up their
veto right against the plan.); David Lazarus, Diablo Canyon Quandary/Plans for open-air
storage of spent fuel rods receive environmentalists' reluctant approval, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Nov. 7, 2000, at A1, available at 2000 WL 6496178 (Klaus Schumann, a Green
Party activist and member of the San Luis Obispo County Nuclear Waste Management Com-
mittee, states that dry storage at the utility sites is safer than transporting the waste to a
central repository.); Governors Push for Removal of Spent Fuel, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Ban-
gor, Me., Sept. 30, 2000, available at 2000 WL 22134955 [hereinafter Governors Push]
(governors of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Maine pushing for removal of wastes from
their states); Failure to Meet Nuclear Waste Storage Deadline: Hearing Before the Comm.
On Energy & Natural Resources, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of John W. Rowe, Chair-
man, Unicorn Corp. and Commonwealth Edison), available at 2000 WL 23833267 [herein-
after Rowe Testimony] ("construction of the repository [must begin] so that it is opened at
the earliest possible date"); Steve Cook, Radioactive Waste: Murkowski Says DOE Pact on
Waste Will Deprive Permanent Facility of Funds, ENVT. RPTR. (BNA) No. 31, at 2135 (Oct.
6, 2000) [hereinafter Radioactive Waste] (Republican Senator Frank Murkowski of Alaska,
Chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, encourages speeding up con-
struction of the Yucca Mountain facility.). See infra notes 132-34 for information on several
scientists' views of the Yucca Mountain project.
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tions in the affirmative, these issues will likely arise in cases brought by nuclear
power companies against the United States Department of Energy (DOE).
The nuclear power companies are magnifying the already serious problem
of nuclear waste disposal by asking for damages - damages that will take away
from the funds necessary to build a nuclear waste repository. The power com-
panies' claims are based on the DOE's failure to begin removal of nuclear
waste from power company properties by the January 31, 1998 contractual
deadline.2 The potential liability arising from these cases is between $2 billion
and $80 billion.3 This liability could result in billions of dollars taken away
from the Nuclear Waste Fund; billions of dollars unavailable for the construc-
tion of a permanent nuclear waste repository.4 If there is less money available
for construction, additional funding must be allocated from elsewhere. If addi-
tional funding is not allocated, either construction delays will continue or con-
struction must be conducted below proposed standards. Governmental attempts
to prevent additional damages from accruing will likely result in the govern-
ment pushing forward with construction, not only with less funding than pro-
jected, but also on a tighter schedule. There is a risk that politics will win over
science, with Congress discontinuing research and ignoring studies indicating
Yucca Mountain is not an appropriate location for a permanent nuclear waste
repository. 5 These lawsuits would result in a disastrous downward spiral:
more delays causing greater damages, greater damages resulting in less money
in the Nuclear Waste Fund, less money in the Nuclear Waste Fund creating
2 See Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2000); N.
States Power Co. v. United States, 224 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
3 See, e.g., Radioactive Waste: DOE Reaches First Pact With Utility Over Possession of
Spent Nuclear Fuel, ENVT. RPrR. (BNA) No. 31, at 1568 (July 28, 2000) [hereinafter Radio-
active Waste] (Steve Unglesbee of the Nuclear Energy Institute estimated liability ranging
up to $60 billion); Waste Ruling Blow to DOE, 20 MODERN POWER SYSTEMS 11 (2000),
available at 2000 WL 23384463 (estimates damages running as high as $50 billion); Tony
Batt, Energy Official Says Liability Overstated, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Sept. 21, 2000, at 4B,
available at 2000 WL 8212058 (citing nuclear industry estimates between $40 billion and
$80 billion; government estimates provided by Mary Anne Sullivan, general counsel for the
DOE, falling much lower at approximately $3 billion; and estimates of Senator Frank
Murkowski (R-Alaska) reaching up to $80 billion); Tony Batt, Yucca Mountain Project:
Budget cuts may delay license, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Sept. 29, 2000, at 5B (citing Senator
Murkowski estimating damages between $38 billion and $61 billion); Cook, supra note 1
(Senator Murkowski making lower estimates of damages, totaling only $60.9 billion); Mark
Hand, The Saga of Yucca Mountain, PUB. UTHL. FORT., Mar. 1, 2002, at 38 (citing DOE
estimates of around $2 billion and nuclear industry estimates of $50 billion).
I Section 302(c) of the NWPA directed the U.S. Treasury to establish a Nuclear Waste
Fund. Disposal fees paid by nuclear power companies to the DOE are required to be depos-
ited into this fund, and can only be used for certain enumerated waste disposal activities. 42
U.S.C. §§ 10222(c)-(d). As fees paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund are based directly on the
amount of nuclear energy produced by the industry, reductions in input based on credits
given to companies, or damages paid through settlement or judgments, would reduce the
total available funding to construct a permanent repository or fulfill other enumerated
purposes.
- See, e.g., Failure to Meet Nuclear Waste Storage Deadline: Hearing Before the Comm.
On Energy & Natural Resources, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Ivan Itkin, Director of
DOE Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management), available at 2000 WL 23833264
[hereinafter Itkin Testimony] (they are "nearing completion of the scientific and engineering
work"). See infra notes 136-37 for explanation of how negative results are being ignored.
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more delays and shifting the focus from safety and science to politics and
deadlines.
II. BACKGROUND FACTS AND LEGAL DOCTRINES
A. Nuclear Energy: A Major Power Player in the United States
As energy supply and cost concerns have increased in recent years in the
United States,6 the nuclear power industry's role as a significant provider of
low cost energy has also increased.7 In 1999, the nuclear power industry sup-
plied approximately twenty percent of the nation's energy,8 reaching record
levels of production.9 Nuclear Energy Institute figures show that nuclear
energy production was 5.1 percent higher for the first nine months of 2000 than
the same months in 1999.1" Industry leaders estimate that total 2000 produc-
tion was four percent higher than the 1999 production levels.11
Production increases have occurred despite a decline in the number of
operational power plants. No new plants have opened in the United States
since 1996,12 while four have shut down during this period.13 These produc-
tion increases have resulted because U.S. nuclear producers have steadily
increased their actual level of production relative to production capacity since
the 1980s, a figure known as the capacity factor. 14 Nuclear power producers
could continue this trend, as plants reached only an 89.6 percent capacity factor
in 2000.'5
Nuclear energy is the only major form of domestic energy that has not
undergone substantial price increases in recent months. 16 Marvin Fertel, Senior
6 Neville Nankivell, Nuclear Renaissance... : As concern grows over rising fuel costs and
reliable energy supplies, nuclear power is getting a second look. So are the arguments
against it, NATIONAL POST, May 4, 2001, at C19, available at 2001 WL 20480449.
7 Id.
8 Rowe Testimony, supra note 1. John W. Rowe, as the Chairman, President, and CEO of
Unicorn Corporation and Commonwealth Edison, reflects a nuclear industry view of the role
of nuclear power in our nation's energy supply. See also Nuclear Energy Surpasses Coal-
Fired Plants as Leader in Low-Cost Electricity Production, Nuclear Energy Institute, at
http://www.nei.org/doc.asp?docid=702&UpFront=true (last visited Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter Nuclear Energy] (based on 1999 figures from the DOE's Energy Information
Administration).
9 Nuclear Energy, supra note 8.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Nuclear Data: U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, Nuclear Energy Institute, at http://www.nei.
org/doc.asp?catnum=3&catid=13 (last visited Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Nuclear 13] (A
total of five plants opened in the 1990s: three in 1990, one in 1993, and one in 1996.).
13 Nuclear Data: Reactors Shut Down/Decommissioned, Nuclear Energy Institute, at http://
www.nei.org/doc.asp?catnum=3&catid=19 (last visited Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Nuclear
19] (Two plants were shut down in 1997 and two in 1998. A total of ten plants have shut
down since 1989.).
14 Nuclear 13, supra note 12.
15 Id.
16 Rowe Testimony, supra note 1. See also Nuclear Energy, supra note 8 (Utility Data
Institute figures show that nuclear energy was the lowest cost major fuel source for 1999 at
1.83 cents per kilo-watt hour (kwh). This was lower than 1998 production costs. These
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Vice President of the Nuclear Energy Institute, attributes the continuing low
prices of nuclear energy to low production costs. 7
B. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act
On January 7, 1983, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
198218 (NWPA) in an effort to dispose of the nation's nuclear waste while
addressing the safety of the public and environment. 9 The NWPA makes the
federal government responsible for disposal of the waste, and the nuclear indus-
try responsible for disposal costs. 20
The NWPA effectively required nuclear power companies to enter into
contracts with the DOE for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
nuclear waste.2 1 Specifically, the contracts were required to provide that "fol-
lowing commencement of operation of a repository," the Secretary of Energy
was to take title of the waste.22 Additionally, in exchange for payment of statu-
torily established fees, the Secretary was required to dispose of the waste
"beginning not later than January 31, 1998. ",23 These fees included a one-time
payment based on energy produced before April 7, 1983, and on-going fees
based on later energy production. 4
In 1983, the DOE created the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent
Nuclear Fuel.25 The contract incorporated the disposal fees to be paid by the
nuclear power companies,26 the January 31, 1998 disposal date established by
the NWPA, 7 and included delay and remedy provisions. 8 Under the delay
provisions, neither party would be held liable for unavoidable delays. The con-
tract defines unavoidable delays as those outside the control, fault, or negli-
figures do not reflect the large increases in oil and gas prices that were experienced in
2000.).
" Nuclear Energy, supra note 8.
18 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (1994).
19 42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(4).
20 42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(4)-(5).
21 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(1) (authorizing the DOE to enter into nuclear waste disposal con-
tracts); 42 U.S.C. § 10222(b)(1)(A) (prohibiting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from
issuing licenses to nuclear power companies that fail to enter into waste disposal contracts
with the DOE).
22 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5)(A).
23 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5)(B).
24 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(2) and (3).
25 10 C.F.R. § 961.11 (1983).
26 10 C.F.R. § 961.11 (VII.A).
27 10 C.F.R. § 961.11 (II).
28 10 C.F.R. § 961.11 (IX.A) (provides that neither party to the contract "shall be liable
under this contract for damages caused by failure to perform its obligations hereunder, if
such failure arises out of causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the
party failing to perform"); § 961. t 1 (IX.B) (provides that "[i]n the event of any delay in the
delivery, acceptance or transport of [Spent Nuclear Fuel] to or by DOE caused by circum-
stances within the reasonable control of either the Purchaser or DOE or their respective
contractors or suppliers, the charges and schedules specified by this contract will be equita-
bly adjusted to reflect any estimated additional costs incurred by the party not responsible for
or contributing to the delay"); § 961.11 (XI) (provides that "[n]othing in this contract shall
be construed to preclude either party from asserting its rights and remedies under the con-
tract or at law").
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gence of the non-performing party.29 A non-performing party is, however,
liable for an avoidable delay, a delay within its "reasonable control."
30
The original NWPA provisions, as enacted in 1983, required the Secretary
of Energy to recommend at least five possible nuclear repository sites to the
President. 3' The Secretary then had to select three candidate sites from the
recommendations, subject to the President's approval.32 In 1986, the Reagan
administration selected Hanford Reservation, Washington; Deaf Smith County,
Texas; and Yucca Mountain, Nevada as the three candidate sites.
33
Texas and Washington had great political advantage over Nevada in the
selection process, as top congressional leaders represented those two candidate
states.34 These representatives were influential in Congress's decision to con-
centrate on only one site.35 In 1987, in what is commonly known as the
"Screw Nevada Bill," 36 Congress amended the NWPA to specify that Yucca
Mountain was the favored repository location. 7
In response to the 1987 amendment to the NWPA, the Nevada legislature,
in January 1989, enacted two resolutions opposing the construction of a nuclear
waste repository in the state.3 8 In June 1989, the legislature passed legislation
making it illegal "to store high-level radioactive waste in Nevada." 39
In an effort to object to the characterization of Nevada as a potential
repository site, Nevada transmitted its resolutions and legislation to Congress
and the President,4 ° as permitted under the NWPA.4 1 The Ninth Circuit held
that these attempts at a legislative veto failed because they were preempted by
29 10 C.F.R. § 961.11 (IX.A).
30 10 C.F.R. § 961.11 (IX.B).
31 42 U.S.C. § 10132.
32 Id.
33 See generally Mark E. Rosen, Nevada v. Watkins: Who Gets the Shaft?, 10 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 239, 247-48 (1991); James H. Davenport, The Federal Structure: Can Congress Com-
mandeer Nevada to Participate in its Federal High Level Waste Disposal Program?, 12 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 539, 549 (1993).
34 The Speaker of the House and Vice President of the United States, who also serves as
President of the Senate, were both from Texas. Washington's interests were advanced by the
House Majority Whip, a representative from that state. At the time, Nevada had no high-
ranking members of Congress. Michael Barone & Grant Ujifusa, ALMANAC OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 1148, 1186-89 (1990).
15 See Press Release, Edward J. Markey, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy Conser-
vation and Power of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representa-
tives (Oct. 20, 1986).
36 See, e.g., Ed Vogel, Innocence Lost, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., July 10, 2002, at A9 (stating
that "[t]he [Yucca Mountain Amendments] became known in the Silver State as the 'Screw
Nevada Bill"').
17 42 U.S.C. § 10172(a) (1997). See also Allen, supra note 1.
38 Assembly Joint Resolution 4 expressed the legislature's "adamant opposition to place-
ment of a high-level nuclear waste repository in the State of Nevada." Assembly Joint Reso-
lution 6 provided that the federal government shall not place a repository in Nevada "without
the prior consent of the Nevada Legislature or cession of jurisdiction." AJR 6 went on to
deny both consent to and cession of jurisdiction for the placement of a repository in the state.
See Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1550-51 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1105 (1991).
'9 NEV. REV. STAT. 459.910 (1989).
40 See Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1551.
4' 42 U.S.C. § 10136(b)(2) (1997).
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the NWPA, the very statute that granted Nevada the authority to object. The
court found that Congress's intent to characterize Yucca Mountain as a poten-
tial repository, as expressed through the 1987 amendments, would be frustrated
if Nevada was allowed to object.42
C. Department of Energy's Breach of Contract
The DOE announced, in 1994, that it would be unable to meet the January
1998 statutory and contractual deadline for disposal of nuclear waste, and that
disposal would not begin until at least 2010.4 3 The DOE, in the Final Interpre-
tation of Nuclear Waste Acceptance Issues, determined that in the absence of a
permanent or interim storage facility, the government did not have an uncondi-
tional statutory or contractual duty to begin accepting waste by January 31,
1998. 4' The DOE concluded that under the "logic, language, and structure" of
the NWPA, the DOE's duty to take title to and dispose of nuclear waste arises
only after a repository begins operation. 45 The agency reasoned that the DOE
could not reasonably be required to take title to and dispose of waste in the
absence of a functional repository. 46 The DOE noted the hurdles that must be
faced before disposal could begin - determining that, with such burdens, the
1998 deadline could not be unconditional.47
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
vacated the Final Interpretation in Indiana Michigan Power Co. v. United
States,4 8 finding the deadline was not conditioned on the availability of a
repository.49 The court held that "dispose" should be read under its common
meaning - "to get rid of; throw away; discard" - rather than under the statutory
definition of disposal, the interpretation advanced by the DOE.5 ° The court
further found that disposal could not be conditioned on the opening of a reposi-
tory, as the Standard Contract provides for the DOE's services to commence
with facility operations, and facility is defined to include "facilit[ies] to which
spent nuclear fuel and/or high-level radioactive waste may be shipped by DOE
prior to its transportation to a disposal facility."'51 The court also observed that
the NWPA included definitions of disposal broader than those advanced by the
42 See Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1561.
43 Waste Acceptance Issues, 59 Fed. Reg. 27,007-08 (Dep't Energy May 25, 1994) (No. of
Inquiry).
4 Nuclear Waste Acceptance Issues, 60 Fed. Reg. 21,793 (Dep't Energy May 3, 1995).
" Id. The DOE also notes that the Standard Contract conditions the DOE's provision of
services on "the commencement of facility operations." Id. (citing 10 CFR § 961.11, Art.
II).
46 Id.
47 Id. Some examples of hurdles the DOE must face in preparing a repository are: (1) the
fact that Yucca Mountain is the only potential disposal site under the statute; (2) that Yucca
Mountain may be found unsuitable as a disposal site; (3) conditions placed on the develop-
ment of the site; and (4) numerous procedural steps that must be followed in the approval of
the site. Id.
48 88 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
49 Id.
1o Id. at 1275 (citing WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED
654 (1961)).
5' Id. (citing 10 C.F.R. § 961.11, Art. 1).
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DOE. 52 The D.C. Circuit determined that the DOE need not take title to the
waste, which requires commencement of repository operations, prior to dispos-
ing of spent nuclear fuel.5 3 Therefore, the court held that the plain reading of
the NWPA and Standard Contract required removal of waste from the nuclear
power plants by the January 1998 deadline.54
The DOE then announced that it would still be unable to meet the contrac-
tual deadline and its failure to perform would not be compensable, as it would
be considered an unavoidable delay under the contract. 55 In Northern States
Power Co. v. Department of Energy56 (hereinafter Northern States I) the D.C.
Circuit refused to grant several nuclear companies a writ of mandamus ordering
the DOE to meet its contractual deadline.5 1 In the same decision, however, the
D.C. Circuit issued a writ of mandamus prohibiting the DOE from determining
that delays caused because the repository had not been completed were una-
voidable under the remedies provision of the Standard Contract.
58
While the DOE acknowledged its contractual duty to remove nuclear
waste from the plants by January 1998, it maintained that meeting the deadline
was impossible because of complications with developing a permanent reposi-
tory at Yucca Mountain. 59 Waste removal has still not begun. The nuclear
power companies argue that construction of a permanent repository must begin
immediately, so that the facility may open as soon as possible.6 ° The govern-
ment continues to project, however, that the repository will not be completed
and waste disposal will not begin by 2010.61
In the meantime, waste is being stored at the power company sites. The
utilities are storing much of this waste in large pools of water that cool the
waste. As the pools at many plants are running out of space, several companies
have, or will soon, incur the cost of constructing on-site dry storage facilities.
While these dry storage facilities often consist of casks that can also serve as
containers for transport, they are very costly. 62
52 Id.
51 Id. at 1276.
54 Id. at 1277.
5 Lira Behrens, Judges Appear Sympathetic to Utilities' Plea During Waste-Case Orals,
INSIDE ENERGY, Sept. 29, 1997, available at 1997 WL 9131258.
56 128 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
57 Id. at 759.
58 Id. at 760.
59 John J. Fialka, WALL STREET JOURNAL (subscription required), Sept. 1, 2000.
6 Rowe Testimony, supra note 1. See also Failure to Meet Nuclear Waste Storage Dead-
line: Hearing Before the Comm. On Energy and Natural Resources, 106th Cong. (2000)
(statement of Michael E. Thomas, Vice President, Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company),
available at 2000 WL 1533436 [hereinafter Thomas Testimony].
61 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2000). But
see Memorandum from the Comptroller General of the U.S. General Accounting Office 299
(Sept. 27, 1994), available at 1994 WL 810573 (General Accounting Office does not believe
that the 2010 completion date is realistic.).
62 Thomas Testimony, supra note 60 (Maine Yankee's dry storage facility will cost about
$60 million to construct and another $4 million to operate each year). Lazarus, supra note 1
(Pacific Gas & Electric's (PG&E) Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant is currently drawing
up plans to construct a dry storage facility because they are running out of space in their
storage pools. Such a storage facility has already been constructed at PG&E's Humbolt Bay
nuclear power plant.).
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D. Claims Against the Department of Energy
On August 31, 2000, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decided two
cases on the issue of nuclear waste: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company v.
United States63 and Northern States Power Company v. United States64 (here-
inafter Northern States III). Based on these two cases, the court held that four
nuclear power companies could sue the DOE for breach of contract. These
claims were based on the DOE's failure to dispose of the companies' nuclear
waste by the January 31, 1998 contractual deadline.65 The DOE argued that
the utilities should first be required to pursue administrative remedies available
under the contract, as the remedy provision included any delay in the accept-
ance of nuclear waste.66
The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that the administrative remedy pro-
visions did not apply to the damages claimed by the power companies.6 7 In
order for the remedy provisions to apply, damages must have accrued under the
contract.6 8 Damages are not under the contract unless the breaching party has
begun satisfying its contractual obligations.6 9
Additionally, the court found that the limited relief provided in the remedy
provisions of the Standard Contract did not provide adequate relief for com-
plete failure to perform under the contract.70 Here, the DOE had not yet begun
to satisfy its obligations under the contract through the removal of waste from
power plants. As such, damages were outside the scope of the contract and a
satisfactory remedy was available only through a breach of contract claim.7'
While the Maine Yankee and Northern States III decisions applied specifi-
cally to four nuclear power companies, they have implications for the entire
nuclear power industry. Some believe these decisions will encourage other
companies to pursue their contractual rights against the DOE.7 2 Currently, sev-
enteen breach of contract cases between nuclear power companies and the DOE
are pending before the United States Court of Federal Claims. 73 Total damages
from all potential claims could be as high as $80 billion dollars. 7 4 The Maine
63 225 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (involving three New England power companies: Maine
Yankee Atomic Power Company, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, and Yankee
Atomic Electric Company).
6 224 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
65 See generally Maine Yankee, 225 F.3d 1336; N. States, 224 F.3d 1361.
66 Maine Yankee, 225 F.3d at 1338; N. States, 224 F.3d at 1366. 10 C.F.R. § 961.11, Art.
IX.B (provides that "any delay in the delivery, acceptance or transport of [Spent Nuclear
Fuel]" within the control of one of the contract parties is subject to equitable adjustment of
charges or schedules).
67 Maine Yankee, 225 F.3d at 1342; N. States, 224 F.3d at 1367.
61 Maine Yankee, 225 F.3d at 1341; see generally N. States, 224 F.3d at 1367.
69 Maine Yankee, 225 F.3d at 1341; see generally N. States, 224 F.3d 1361.
70 Maine Yankee, 225 F.3d at 1342; see generally N. States, 224 F.3d 1361.
71 Maine Yankee, 225 F.3d at 1340-43; N. States, 224 F.3d 1361 (explaining conclusion in
general and referencing Maine Yankee for a full explanation of conclusion).
72 Lira Behrens, DOE Loses Key Nuclear Waste Decisions, INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FEDERAL
LANDS, Sept. 4, 2000, available at 2000 WL 14125724 (quoting Bob Bishop, general coun-
sel for the Nuclear Energy Institute).
7' Fed. Court Allows TVA Contract Claim to Proceed Against DOE, ANDREWS HAZARDOUS
WASTE LITIG. REP., Feb. 15, 2002, at 9.
74 Batt, Energy Official Says Liability Overstated, supra note 3. See generally note 3.
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Yankee and Northern States III cases alone amount to almost $1.4 billion in
claims, with Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, Connecticut Yankee
Atomic Power Company, and Yankee Atomic Electric Company seeking
approximately $300 million and Northern States Power seeking more than $1
billion.75
One company, PECO Energy, settled its claim against the DOE with
respect to its Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station.7 6 The settlement allows
PECO to reduce its Nuclear Waste Fund deposits from approximately $35 mil-
lion per year to $5 million per year, while the company continues to store waste
on its premises.77 Many are skeptical of the government's settlement attempts,
worrying that a "one size fits all" settlement plan will fail, and that settlement
does not address the industry's desire to have the waste removed from the
properties.7 8
In Alabama Power v. Department of Energy,79 eight nuclear power com-
panies sued the DOE in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for siphoning
money away from the proposed repository by reaching this settlement with
PECO.80 The companies alleged that settlements altering the statutory and
contractual fee payment schemes are outside the legal authority of the DOE,
resulting in unauthorized use of the Nuclear Waste Fund.8 ' The Eleventh Cir-
cuit agreed, finding that "the NWPA clearly does not allow the Department to
utilize [Nuclear Waste Fund] monies to pay for the interim storage costs of the
Department's contract creditors." 82
The Eleventh Circuit reached its decision for several reasons. First, the
NWPA specified the types of waste disposal activities for which the Nuclear
Waste Fund could be used - a group of activities directed at permanent rather
than interim storage.83 The court also noted that the NWPA specifically
requires that interim storage be funded from the Interim Storage Fund rather
than the Nuclear Waste Fund.84 In reaching its conclusion, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit cited the "common sense and ... practical understanding of the regulatory
scheme Congress envisioned," finding that the government would never be
75 Wastes & Hazardous Substances Nuclear Waste: Court Allows Plants to Sue DOE Over
Fuel, AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK GREENWIRE, Sept. 5, 2000. See also Behrens, supra
note 72.
76 Radioactive Waste, supra note 3.
71 Batt, Energy official says liability overstated, supra note 3. Batt, Yucca Mountain Pro-
ject, supra note 3 (citing Senator Murkowski). See also Benjamin Grove, DOE is Sued Over
Nuclear Storage Deal, LAS VEGAS SUN, Dec. 13, 2000.
78 See, e.g., Rowe Testimony, supra note 1; Cook, supra note I (citing John Rowe, Chair-
man of Unicom Corp., an electric utility holding company).
79 307 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2002).
80 Grove, supra note 77 (The eight companies involved in the suit are Georgia Power and
Alabama Power (Southern Company affiliates), Duke Energy, Entergy, Carolina Power &
Light Energy Inc., Florida Power & Light Group Inc., TXU Corp., and Northern States
Power Company. These companies operate a total of fourteen nuclear power plants.). See
also Utilities Sue to End DOE-Peco Deal; Fear Nuclear Waste Fund Depletion, NUCLEAR
WASTE NEWS, Dec. 21, 2000, at 2000 WL 29762568 [hereinafter Utilities Sue].
81 307 F.3d at 1313.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1314.
84 Id.
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held liable if the DOE could pay utilities for its breach from funds contributed
by the utilities.s5
E. Nuclear Waste Fund
Although the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Alabama Power signals one
circuit's approach to the contrary, money to satisfy the claims against the DOE
could potentially come from the Nuclear Waste Fund. These same funds are
also needed to complete the nuclear waste repository, enabling the Department
of Energy to satisfy its obligations under the contract.8 6
The Nuclear Waste Fund consists of all payments made to the Secretary of
Energy under contracts with nuclear power producers, and appropriations made
by Congress. 7 Under the NWPA, the Nuclear Waste Fund can only be used
for limited purposes.88 While no affirmative decision has been made that judg-
ments can be taken from the fund, the D.C. Circuit in Northern States Power
Co. v. U.S. Department of Energy (Northern States II) declined to find that
judgments could not be taken from the fund.89
F. Recent Developments
Progress has been made toward the development of Yucca Mountain since
the Maine Yankee and Northern States III decisions were reached. In Novem-
ber 2001, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued its final regulations
regarding disposal of nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain.9 ° On February 14,
2002, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham formally recommended Yucca
Mountain as the nation's nuclear waste repository. 9 ' The following day, Presi-
dent Bush accepted Abraham's recommendation and submitted the issue to
Congress. 92 Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn vetoed the proposal in April
2002. 93 Guinn's veto was overridden by the United States House of Represent-
atives in May 2002 and the U.S. Senate in July 2002.94 Bush signed the legis-
lation on July 23, 2002, making Yucca Mountain the nation's sole nuclear
waste repository.9 5
Nevada government officials, residents, and business leaders continue to
oppose storage of nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain, as the DOE works to
85 Id.
86 42 U.S.C. § 10222(d).
87 42 U.S.C. § 10222(c).
88 42 U.S.C. § 10222(d) (limiting use of the Nuclear Waste Fund to "radioactive waste
disposal activities").
89 N. States Power Co. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 1998 WL 276581, *1 (D.C. Cir.
1998). But see Alabama Power v. Dep't of Energy, 307 F.3d 1300 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (prohib-
iting deductions from the Nuclear Waste Fund for settlement of claims against the DOE).
90 NRC Issues Final Disposal Standard for Yucca Mountain, NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, Nov.
8, 2001.
91 Bush Signs Bill Designating Yucca Mountain as Nuclear-Waste Dump, 22 ANDREWS
UTIL. INDUS. LMn. REP. 14 (Aug. 2, 2002).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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obtain a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 96 Nevada's senior
senator, Harry Reid, has vowed to do everything in his power to prevent such
storage. 97 Casino executives plan to fight the project with their national
clout.9 8 Nevada also continues to fight the project through litigation and has
developed the Nevada Protection Fund to support its opposition to the reposi-
tory.99 The state has taken further steps to make storage at the site more diffi-
cult, such as refusing to renew the DOE's water rights at Yucca Mountain."0
Other groups, including the Sierra Club and Nuclear Information
Resources Service, oppose the project.'" A coalition of organizations, which
has formed the Transportation Safety Coalition, has also expressed concern
about the regulations applicable to the Yucca Mountain repository. 10 2 Mem-
bers of Congress, including Representative Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.), also
oppose storage of nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain.
10 3
Il. DISCUSSION
A. Implications of Maine Yankee and Northern States III on Current and
Future Breach of Contract Cases Between Nuclear Power Companies
and the DOE
Leaders within the nuclear power industry feel the Federal Circuit's deci-
sions in Maine Yankee and Northern States III are significant in several
ways.1 ' They believe greater damages will be awarded through breach of con-
tract cases than would be awarded through administrative proceedings.
1 0 5
They speculate that many more damage claims will soon be filed by the nuclear
industry, with the courts looking not to whether there is liability, but to how
much liability there is. 10 6 They believe courts will award damages rather than
96 Energy Secretary Approves Nev. Site as Nuclear-Waste Repository, 8 ANDREWS UTIL.
INDUS. LrrIG. REP. 13 (Feb. 2002).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Marta Adams & Andrea Nichols, The Yucca Mountain Fight is Far From Over, 10 NEV.
LAW. 26 (Feb. 2002).
'00 The Nevada Water Engineering Office refused to extend the DOE's temporary water
rights, which expired on April 9, 2002. Nevada Nuclear Waste Project Office Director Rob-
ert Loux explained that the license would not be renewed because "'[s]ite characterization is
over' or DOE would not have made a formal recommendation." Nevada Officials Plan to
Leave Yucca Mountain High and Dry, NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, Mar. 14, 2002.
101 Bush Signs Bill Designating Yucca Mountain as Nuclear-Waste Dump, supra note 91
(noting disapproval of Sierra Club Executive Directory Carl Pope); Industry Celebrates
Nuclear Future; Activists Plan Lawsuits, Protests, NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, July 11, 2002
(noting campaigns being considered by the Nuclear Information Resources Service).
102 Transportation Coalition Opposes Harmonization of NRC, IAEA Rules, NUCLEAR
WASTE NEWS, June 27, 2002 (The members of the Transportation Safety Coalition include
the American Public Health Association, Environmental Working Group, Nevada Agency
for Nuclear Projects, National Environmental Trust, Physicians for Social Responsibility,
Public Citizen, and U.S. Public Interest Research Group.).
103 Yucca Mountain, NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, July 18, 2002 (quoting Representative
Gephardt as vowing to "fight against spending money to implement the plan").
104 See Rowe Testimony, supra note 1.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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credits from the Nuclear Waste Fund, as would be the case with settlements, so
judgments will not effect the construction of a repository.1 0 7 The industry
claim that damages will not be paid from the Nuclear Waste Fund is contra-
dicted by other reports, however. 10 8 When the issue came before the D.C. Cir-
cuit, the court "express[ed] no opinion on the legality of the DOE's using utility
or ratepayer-supplied monies to pay costs or damages."' 0 9
B. Public Policy Analysis
1. Nuclear Power Companies Creating a Downward Spiral: Suing for
Damages Leading to Reduced Funds which Leads to More Delays
and Increased Damages
The nuclear power companies' lawsuits against the DOE decrease the
funding available for the development and construction of a permanent nuclear
waste repository. The settlement with PECO, for example, decreases funding
by millions of dollars. "0 The PECO settlement is small, however, compared to
the billions of dollars in damages that would be awarded if all cases between
nuclear power companies and the DOE went to trial."' The reduced funding
could be enough to cause delays that would result in waste continuing to pile up
at power plants." 2 While the DOE asserted that the reduction in funding that
would have resulted from settlements (between $2 billion and $3 billion) would
not have caused problems for the Yucca Mountain project," 3 the same could
probably not be said for the up to $80 billion in damages that could be awarded
through litigation."'
2. Need for Increased Funding from either Congressional Allocations
or Nuclear Waste Fund Deposits by Nuclear Power Companies
It is argued that, in order to prevent additional delays and damages, Con-
gress must approve the full amounts requested for the project. 1 1 5 The fiscal
year 2001 budget requests were not granted in full.16 While site recommenda-
107 Id.
108 Batt, Energy Official Says Liability Overstated, supra note 3.
'o Northern States 11, 1998 WL 276581, *1 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
110 The PECO settlement will result in approximately $300 million less being deposited into
the Nuclear Waste Fund. This figure is based on an annual reduction of about $30 million
(from $35 million to $5 million) over the course of ten years, from the settlement date in
2000 to the projected date of repository completion in 2010. Cook, supra note 1 (based on
statements made by Senator Murkowski, Chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources
Committee on September 28, 2000).
"I See supra note 3 (estimates of damages ranging from $2 billion to $80 billion).
112 Cook, supra note I (citing comments made by Senator Murkowski).
113 Id. (Ivan Itkin states that "potential loss to the fund from settlements would be at a level
'we can live with.'").
114 See generally supra note 3.
115 Cook, supra note I (citing comments made by Ivan Itkin, Director of the DOE Office of
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management).
116 Id.
[Vol. 3:449
Winter 2002/2003] NUCLEAR POWER COMPANIES SUING DOE 461
tion was nevertheless completed in 2002,117 insufficient funding could delay
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing of the facility.' "8
With Congressional approval, the DOE is authorized to increase fees paid
by nuclear power companies, if necessary to place the full cost of disposal on
the nuclear industry.' '9 Increased rates result in power companies essentially
paying damages to themselves. Another option, supported by the nuclear
industry, would be to force all taxpayers to foot the bill through non-Nuclear
Waste Fund congressional appropriations.' 2 °
3. Affects on Yucca Mountain Repository
a. Additional Delays
Whether settlements are reached with utilities, or the courts award dam-
ages, if the Nuclear Waste Fund is depleted, construction cannot proceed, dam-
ages continue to accrue, and the waste remains at utility sites.' 2 '
b. Incomplete or Accelerated Research in Attempts to Speed Up
Completion of the Project
Some have speculated that the Maine Yankee and Northern States III deci-
sions could lead Congress to accelerate the schedule for nuclear waste storage
at the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain.' 2 2 Before these decisions, legis-
lation was proposed that would accelerate the completion of the nuclear waste
repository at Yucca Mountain."2 3 While Congress approved this bill, President
Clinton vetoed it, and the Senate failed to override his veto.' 24
Nuclear industry leaders are urging such accelerated construction. 12 5 The
President of Yankee Power Company, Russell Mellor, has stated that it is not
damages that the company seeks in its suit against the DOE, but for the govern-
ment to be forced to fulfill its contractual and statutory obligations. 12 6 John
Rowe, Chairman of Unicom Corp., similarly suggests that rather than attempt-
ing to reach settlement agreements with nuclear power companies, the DOE
should focus on achieving a "timely opening of the Yucca Mountain
facility." 127
117 See supra notes 91-95.
118 Cook, supra note 1 (citing comments made by Ivan Itkin, Director of the DOE Office of
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management).
119 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(4).
120 Nuclear Executives Bash DOE on Waste Removal, ENERGY REP., Oct. 9, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 8749398 [hereinafter Nuclear Executives Bash].
121 Utilities Sue, supra note 80 (quoting Brian O'Connell, Director of NARUC: "What is
worrisome is that if DOE were to settle with all the others, there would be no revenue
coming in and the program grinds to a halt which, of course, extends the period of time for
providing credits and no fuel ever gets moved in.").
122 Batt, Energy Official Says Liability Overstated, supra note 3.
123 S. 1287, 106th Cong. (2000).
124 Cook, supra note I (the Senate failed to override President Clinton's veto on May 2,
2000 nearly four months before the Maine Yankee and Northern States III decisions were
made on August 31, 2000).
125 Id.
126 id.
127 id.
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With the DOE currently scheduled to file its license application with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission in late 2004,128 the repository at Yucca
Mountain will not be completed and ready to store waste until at least 2010.129
Legislation similar to that introduced during the Clinton administration,
intended to eliminate hurdles in approving and constructing the Yucca Moun-
tain repository, could be introduced under the Bush administration and would
likely be passed by Congress and approved by the President. 130 While few
steps are left in the approval process, many technical questions remain. There-
fore, such legislation would prove that politics has prevailed over science in the
nuclear waste disposal battle.
Studies to assess the feasibility and safety of constructing a permanent
repository at Yucca Mountain are ongoing.131 Scientists have disagreed as to
the adequacy of Yucca Mountain as a repository location,' 32 and the Govern-
ment Accounting Office has concluded that the DOE does not have adequate
information to determine Yucca Mountain's suitability. 133
Potential problems with the Nevada location include rock composition,
geological faulting, young volcanism, and a complicated ground water sys-
128 Abraham Defends Yucca Mountain In First Hill Hearing on Repository, NUCLEAR
WASTE NEWS, Apr. 18, 2002 (citing comments made by Energy Secretary Spencer Abra-
ham). But see Words Change, Substance Does Not In Final GAO Yucca Mountain Report,
NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, Jan. 3, 2002 (citing GAO final report, which concludes that the
DOE will be able to resolve all technical issues and submit its application to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission no sooner than 2006).
129 Energy Secretary Approves Nev. Site as Nuclear-Waste Repository, supra note 96.
130 Congress has recently shown favor to nuclear waste as a continued fuel source in the
United States. In addition to Congress overriding Nevada's veto of the President's recom-
mendation of Yucca Mountain as the nation's permanent waste repository (see supra note
94), the House of Representatives passed a bill encouraging development of nuclear power
in August 2001. Gary C. Rryner, The National Energy Policy: Assessing Energy Policy
Choices, 73 U. COLO. L. Ruv. 341, 356 (2002). Vice President Cheney has also commented
that the nation should increase use of nuclear power and build more nuclear power plants.
Id. Furthermore, the Bush energy plan proposes that the United States nuclear power indus-
try be expanded. Id.
131 Abraham Sees Suitability Decision As Yucca Mountain Priority One, NUCLEAR WASTE
NEWS, Nov. 15, 2001 (citing comments of Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham).
132 Many scientists, primarily outside of government agencies, have asserted that the gov-
ernment's studies that claim to show Yucca Mountain is an adequate site have been both
biased and scientifically inaccurate. See William J. Broad, A Mountain of Trouble, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 1990, § 6, at 37. See also Robert R. Loux, Nuclear Waste: Will the
Nation's Nuclear Waste Policy Succeed at Yucca Mountain?, 126 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 27, 52
(1990). Government officials, however, assert that their testing has been sufficient. Ivan
Itkin, Director of the DOE Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, claims that
they have "conduct[ed] a world-class scientific and technical program at Yucca Mountain."
The DOE is making efforts to develop a more complete three-dimensional model of the
geological formations of the site to better enable them to predict repository performance.
Additionally, he says that they are currently conducting the "largest thermal test of a geo-
logic formation in the world." Itkin Testimony, supra note 5.
133 GAO Report Casts Doubt on Yucca Mt., 7 ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG. STRATEGY I
(Dec. 2001) (The draft report issued on November 30, 2001 criticized the DOE's intention to
recommend Yucca Mountain as a repository site in light of the inadequacy of information
regarding the suitability of the location.); Energy Secretary Approves Nev. Site as Nuclear-
Waste Repository, supra note 96 (The final GAO report, issued in December 2001, recom-
mended that siting decision be postponed until all technical issues are resolved.).
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tem. 1 34 Each of these problems alone is sufficient to disqualify the site under
134 One of the initial reasons why Yucca Mountain was extremely appealing as a repository
site was the low water table, which would enable to DOE to locate the repository one thou-
sand feet below the earth's surface but hundreds of feet above the water table. Several
scientists argue, however, that there is evidence that the water will rise to the level of the
repository, causing serious problems. Jerry S. Szymanski, a former geologist on the Yucca
Mountain Project for the DOE, is a proponent of this theory, arguing that water will seep into
fractures and faults. If an earthquake occurs, Szymanski believes that the water will be
thrust up to the level of the repository, vaporize due to the heat of the canisters, and poten-
tially cause an explosion, releasing radioactivity. He points to the existence at Yucca Moun-
tain of tavertine, a type of rock formed in the presence of water over long periods of time,
often as a result of fault lines, in support of his theory. Charles B. Archambeau, a University
of Colorado geophysicist, has found Szymanski's study persuasive. He has been quoted as
saying:
You flood that thing and you could blow the top off the mountain. At the very least, the radioac-
tive material would go into the ground water and spread to Death Valley, where there are hot
springs all over the place, constantly bringing water up from great depths. It would be picked up
by the birds, the animals, the plant life. It would start creeping out of Death Valley. You
couldn't stop it. That's the nightmare. It could slowly spread to the whole biosphere. If you
want to envision the end of the world, that's it.
Broad, supra note 132, at 37.
Several other independent scientists have toured the site with Szymanski, each support-
ing his views. Broad, supra note 132, at 37. See also Betsy Carpenter, A Nuclear Grave-
yard, U.S. NEWS AND WoRLD REP., Mar. 18, 1991, at 72; William Poole, Gambling with
Tomorrow: Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Depository, SIERRA, Sept. 1992, at 50, 56 (both
articles supporting theory that area earthquakes could cause rock fracturing, resulting in
flooding of the repository and rapid contamination of the water table). The activity of the
thirty-two geological fault lines under Yucca Mountain has been demonstrated more than
once in recent years. Eight years ago, in June 1992, an earthquake measuring 5.6 on the
Richter scale was centered under the site. This earthquake caused approximately $1 million
of damage to a DOE building. Tom Abate, Quake Shakes Up Debate Over Nuclear Dump:
Recent 5.6 Temblor in Nevada Bolsters Backers and Critics, S.F. EXAMINER, July 23, 1992,
at A5, 1992 WL 7587983. More recently, on February 3, 2001, the Las Vegas Valley exper-
ienced an earthquake measuring 3.5 on the Richter scale. Keith Rogers, EARTHQUAKE
POTENTIAL: Nevada Ranks Fifth in Risk Based on Losses, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Feb. 24,
2001, at 4B. These earthquakes are minor compared to those that could potentially result in
the area - which estimates indicate could be as strong as 6.8 on the Richter scale. Id. In
fact, Nevada ranks third in the nation for frequency of strong earthquakes. Id.
The National Academy of Sciences argues that tuff, a volcanic rock at the surface of
Yucca Mountain, is an ideal medium for containing the repository as it is extremely thick,
stable, and dry. Allen, supra note 1. Others argue, on the contrary, that the basalt and tuff
medium do not allow for sufficient natural sealing of fractures and boreholes. ORGANIZA-
TION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD], GEOLOGICAL DISPOSAL OF
RADIOACTIVE WASTE: GEOCHEMICAL PROCESSES 17-19 (1982). Nearby volcanoes also give
rise to concern. These volcanoes are thought to have been active as recently as 20,000 years
ago. See Allen, supra note 1. Estimates of the likelihood of active volcanic activity in the
region over the next 10,000-year range from government figures of one-in-thirty to Nuclear
Regulatory Commission estimates of one-in-six. Robert Bums, Watkins Urged to Declare
Nevada Site Unsuitable for Nuclear Waste, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 19, 1989, 1989 WL
4046972.
Moid Ahmad, a hydrologist at Ohio State University, also argues that hydrological stud-
ies of Yucca Mountain are deficient. Ahmad believes that, by burying nuclear waste at
Yucca Mountain, the ground water of the region will become unusable as the climate
becomes wetter, causing the water table to rise. Nuclear Waste Plan Called a Danger to
Future Groundwater, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 23, 1994, at B3, 1994 WL 6322811. Evidence,
including ancient snail shells, indicates that the region was once under water. Allen, supra
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site screening guidelines.' 35 Despite scientific doubt regarding the Yucca
Mountain site, the DOE has stated that the problems with the location are polit-
ical rather than scientific, and that it is "inconceivable" that the site is an inade-
quate location for the nuclear repository.'36 With this arrogance, the DOE
pushes the project forward; ignoring, de-emphasizing, and making excuses for
negative results that arise. 137
c. Temporary Storage Prior to Completion of Research
One way to prevent additional damages from accruing would be through
the development of a temporary storage facility to be used until a permanent
repository is completed. 138 This alternative has substantial support, 139 but also
has several drawbacks that have prevented its implementation. For example,
opening an interim storage facility would initiate the DOE's duty to take title to
the waste and could result in additional transportation issues.14 This option
note 1. Scientists also foresee water percolating through the ground and into the repository,
causing the storage containers to rust, and radioactive material to enter the water table.
Charles Rousseaux, What Yucca Offers . . . for 10,000 Years Series: Last of Two Parts,
WASH. TIMES, June 7, 2001, at A17. It has been estimated that nuclear particles could reach
the water table in less than one thousand years. K.S. Shrader-Frechette, BURYING UNCER-
TAINTY: RISK AND THE CASE AGAINST GEOLOGICAL DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE 41
(1993). See generally Davenport, supra note 33, at 555.
135 John Boehner, LEGISLATIVE DIGEST CONGRESSIONAL PRESS RELEASES, Dec. 18, 1995,
LEXIS, News Library, Hillpr File.
136 Loux, supra note 132, at 51-52. See also Allen, supra note 1 (quoting Carl Gertz,
DOE's Yucca Mountain Project Manager, as having said in 1988 that "[w]e're 99 percent
sure - well, make that 95 percent - that Yucca Mountain will meet the regulatory require-
ments."); Itkin Testimony, supra note 5 ("A Presidential decision to develop a repository
must be based on sound science."). But see Congress House Approves H.R. 1270 with Veto-
Proof Margin, NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, Nov. 6, 1997, LEXIS, Legnew Library, Energy File
(quoting Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass) "[w]e don't know if Yucca is right. Congress
picked it, not geologists, not scientists."); Boehner, supra note 135.
137 One example of the DOE explaining away scientific problems became apparent when
Syzmanski went to his superiors with evidence that travertine was formed at Yucca Moun-
tain as geological activity pushed water, along with calcium deposits, from deep within the
earth up to levels near the surface. His superiors - who were bureaucrats, not scientists -
turned to the Geological Survey, whose scientists explained that the rock was actually
pedogenic, formed from calcium in rain drops depositing in the area over millions of years.
The DOE attempted to prove that the deposit was superficial, forming from above rather
than below, by removing layers of earth with a bulldozer. The veins of calcium instead
continued deep within the earth. Although core rock samples show that the calcium deposits
extend at least hundreds of yards, and the elements in the deposits show that the water that
formed the deposits was warm, evidence that they were not formed from cool rain water, the
DOE continues to deny Szymanski's claims. At first, Geological Survey scientists went so
far as to say that Szymanski's report was "deceitful" and was filled with "violations of
scientific evidence." These scientists now contend that while some of the deposits could
have been formed from ground water, they are too old to remain significant and that only
lower levels were created from groundwater while upper levels were created by rainfall.
Broad, supra note 132.
138 See generally Governors Push, supra note 1; Cook, supra note 1; Thomas Testimony,
supra note 60; Nuclear Executives Bash, supra note 120.
139 See infra notes 141-46.
140 Amy L. Sypula, Beyond Yucca Mountain: Split Liability Drives Action for Interim
Nuclear Waste Storage, 6 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 251, 277 (1999).
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would also result in additional costs, as the NWPA prohibits the siting of an
interim repository in the same state as the permanent repository.
14
Connecticut Governor John Rowland, Massachusetts Governor Argeo
Paul Cellucci, and Maine Governor Angus S. King, Jr. are among the support-
ers of this plan. 142 These governors argue that removal of waste from decom-
missioned nuclear power plants within their states must begin immediately, so
these lands can be put to financially beneficial use. 14 3 Additionally, they feel
the Nuclear Waste Fund should be dedicated to removal of waste rather than
paying damages to manage waste on site."n
Nuclear power industry leaders have also acknowledged the benefits of
this solution as an alternative to lengthy litigation. 145 A temporary repository
better addresses the desire of the utilities to have waste removed from their
sites than does litigation, which merely awards them damages for keeping the
waste on-site.1 46 Several members of Congress have also advanced this
alternative. 14
7
d. Decreased Federal Funding to State and Affected Counties
Under the NWPA, Nevada and local governments affected by the reposi-
tory are entitled to receive federal funding, derived from the Nuclear Waste
Fund, for the purpose of conducting site characterization activities.' 48 While
these funds were provided annually between 1989 and 1995, the DOE 1996
fiscal year budget did not include such oversight funds for the state. 149 When
Nevada challenged Congress's failure to allocate the state oversight funds for
1996, the Ninth Circuit found that, while the DOE was required to provide
Nevada with adequate oversight funds, the DOE need not make the appropria-
tions on an annual basis.
1 50
The Ninth Circuit decision allows Congress discretion in allocating funds
to affected state and local governments in the future. 15' The likely result will
be a reduction in funding as damage awards deplete the Nuclear Waste Fund.
At the same time that federal funding will be reduced, state oversight costs will
not change, placing an unfair burden on Nevada state and local governments.
Although the federal government has acknowledged the State of Nevada's
interest in this process by providing for Nevada's participation in the character-
ization process, 5 2 the burden of this process is being placed on the citizens of
Nevada, a state that does not even have a nuclear power plant. In passing the
NWPA, Congress saw the need for state and local governments to oversee and
141 42 U.S.C. § 10155.
142 Governors Push, supra note 1.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 See Cook, supra note 1; Thomas Testimony, supra note 60 (money damages will not
solve the problem as the waste will remain at the utility).
147 Nuclear Executives Bash, supra note 120.
148 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10136(c) and 10131(b)(4).
'4 Nevada v. United States Dep't of Energy, 133 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 1998).
15o Id. at 1204.
151 See generally id.
152 42 U.S.C. §§ 10135-36.
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participate in the process, and specified that the Nuclear Waste Fund would
supply necessary funding.153 The NWPA places the burdens of oversight on
those who produce and use the waste.' 54 Congress's actions, and the Court's
decisions, have shifted this burden from those who produce the waste to those
who did not create it and want nothing to do with it, but must protect them-
selves from its potential dangers.
4. Insufficiency of Yucca Mountain
Even if the Yucca Mountain facility is completed in a timely manner, the
nuclear power industry and DOE's battles are not likely to end. Yucca Moun-
tain is planned to hold only 70,000 metric tons of waste, far less than the
87,000 metric tons scheduled for disposal by 2030.155
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the nuclear power industry is suffering damages based on the
DOE's failure to remove waste from power plants by the statutory and contrac-
tual deadline, no one benefits from the resulting litigation. Rather than fighting
for damages that would reduce the Nuclear Waste Fund, or arguing for speedy
but unsafe and unscientific waste disposal, the industry should join the DOE in
determining the viability of the Yucca Mountain repository. If the attorneys'
fees and costs from the litigation were instead used for independent scientific
studies of Yucca Mountain - without political agendas - the process would
move forward in a cautious yet expedited manner.
No one benefits from a wrong decision when it comes to nuclear waste.
The results of contamination are both long lasting and extremely dangerous. 1
56
If the government and nuclear industry push the Yucca Mountain project for-
ward, without serious consideration of scientific studies, life as we know it
153 See 42 U.S.C. § 10136(c) (enabling the Secretary to make grants from the Nuclear
Waste Fund to Nevada and affected local governments for use in oversight and participation
in the characterization process).
154 42 U.S.C. § 10131.
155 Christopher Smith, Troublesome Trash, SALT LAKE TRm., Sept. 1, 1996, at Al, 1996
WL 3044304.
156 A very small amount of nuclear waste can be disastrous. If an amount of plutonium
about the same size as a beach ball was properly dispersed, it could cause lung cancer in
everyone on earth. R. Routley & V. Routley, Nuclear Energy and Obligations to the Future,
21 INQUIRY 133, 136 (1978). See generally Robin Dusek, Lost in Space?: The Legal Feasi-
bility of Nuclear Waste Disposal in Outer Space, 22 WM. & MARY ENVL. L. & POL'Y REV.
181 (1997). Some estimate that a large release of nuclear waste from Yucca Mountain,
which has a capacity to hold 77,000 metric tons of waste, would exceed the environmental
impact of a nuclear war. This is a huge amount of waste compared to the "few dozen
pounds" of waste released in the Chernobyl explosion that is estimated will result in between
17,000 to 475,000 human deaths from cancer. Broad, supra note 132. Each of the spent fuel
assemblies that will be stored in the repository contains a similar amount of radioactivity as
ten Hiroshima bombs. Lazarus, supra note 1 (citing Klaus Schumann, a Green Party activist
and member of the San Luis Obispo County Nuclear Waste Management Committee).
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could end in the western United States, with wide-spread contamination caus-
ing devastating effects on humans and their environment. While considerable
money has been invested in studying the adequacy of the Yucca Mountain site,
it does not begin to compare to the costs of ignoring scientific truth in favor of
political power.
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